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HOW DOES IT FEEL TO ACT TOGETHER? 
 
 
 
 
Elisabeth Pacherie (Institut Jean Nicod, ENS, EHESS, CNRS, Paris)  
 
 
Abstract 
This paper on the phenomenology of joint agency proposes a foray into a little explored 
territory at the intersection of two very active domains of research: joint action and sense of 
agency. I explore two ways in which our experience of joint agency may differ from our 
experience of individual agency. #$%&'(!'he mechanisms of action specification and control 
involved in joint action are typically more complex than those present in individual actions, 
since it is crucial for joint action that people coordinate their plans and actions.!I discuss the 
implications that the&)!*++%,$-.'$+- requirements /$01'!1.2)!3+%!'1)!&'%)-0'1!+3!'1)!&)-&)!
+3!.0)-*4!.-!.0)-'!/.4!)56)%$)-*)!3+%!.!7+$-'!.*'$+-8!9)*+-,(!)-0.0)/)-'!$-!7+$-'!.*'$+-!
/.4!$-2+:2)!.!'%.-&3+%/.'$+-!+3!.0)-'$2)!$,)-'$'4!.-,!.!6.%'$.:!+%!*+/6:)')!&1$3'!3%+/!.!
&)-&)!+3!&):3;.0)-*4!'+!.!&)-&)!+3!<);.0)-*48!I discuss several factors that may contribute to 
shaping our sense of agentive identity in joint action. 
 
Keywords: joint action; coordination processes; sense of joint agency; agentive identity; 
 
! =!
1. Introduction 
In the last decade, there has been an explosion of interest among philosophers and cognitive 
scientists alike in the topic of joint action. During the same period, the phenomenology of 
action and the experience of agency for action have also attracted considerable research 
interest. Yet, the phenomenology of joint action, an important topic that lies at the intersection 
of these two very active domains of research, remains to this day little explored.  
We very often perform actions together with others and these joint actions take a multitude of 
forms. But how does it feel to act together? What are the similarities and differences in how 
people experience agency for individual and for joint actions? Could our experience of 
agency for joint action be not just quantitatively but also qualitatively different from our 
experience of individual agency? Could it involve a transformation of the experienced unit of 
agency itself? Suppose, for instance, that Natalie and Günther are cooking a dinner together. 
Is Günther's sense of agency for this action weaker than if he had been preparing dinner on his 
own? Does it make a difference whether one is a better cook than the other or whether one is 
bossing the other around? Does it make a difference whether their actions are perfectly 
coordinated or whether they keep getting in each other's way? What if the dinner they prepare 
together is much more sumptuous than what either of them could have achieved on his own? 
Can their preparing this dinner together foster a kind of team spirit? Does it make a difference 
whether it was their common plan to invite people for dinner or whether Natalie has simply 
enlisted Günther's help to prepare dinner for her friends? All these issues concerning the 
phenomenology of joint action and the factors that may influence it have only very recently 
started to be addressed (Obhi & Hall, 2011; Pacherie, 2012; van der Wel, Sebanz & Knoblich, 
2012; Wiess, Herwig & Schütz-Bosbach, 2011).  
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The main aim of this paper is to explore two ways in which our experience of joint 
agency may differ from our experience of individual agency. There is now considerable 
evidence that the sense of agency we experience for an individual action relies on a 
multiplicity of cues related to different levels of action specification and control. In joint 
action, however, people face coordination demands at both the planning and implementation 
stages that they do not face when acting alone. To get a better grip on the phenomenology of 
joint action, we need to know how these demands are met – i.e., what further cognitive 
processes are involved in joint action to ensure coordination – and what implications this has 
for the sense of agency we may experience over joint outcomes. This first aspect of the 
phenomenology of joint action is concerned with the strength of the sense of agency for a 
joint outcome. Let me call it the outcome-related aspect of the phenomenology of joint 
agency. In addition, the phenomenology of joint agency presents a second challenge. When 
agents acting on their own are asked whether they experience a sense of agency for an 
outcome, they are typically either faced with a binary choice (me/not me) or asked to select a 
value on a scale labeled 'me' at one extremity and 'not me' at the other (or some variation 
thereof). When agents acting jointly with others are asked the same question, they confront an 
ambiguity. Is the alternative me/not me or us/not us? When answering 'yes!', do they mean 'I 
did it!' or 'we did it!'? In other words, when acting together with others, an agent may also 
undergo a transformation of her agentive identity and experience a sense of we-agency rather 
than of self-agency. Let us call this the agent-related aspect of the phenomenology of joint 
action.  
In the next section, I offer a brief survey of recent, complementary models of how and 
where in the cognitive architecture the sense of agency for individual actions is generated, 
pointing out the relations they draw between action specification and control mechanisms and 
processes involved in the generation of the sense of agency. In section 3, I discuss the specific 
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requirements that bear on joint action—in particular, the requirements concerning the 
coordination of participants’ actions with respect to their joint goal—and the coordination 
mechanisms involved in joint action. In section 4, I discuss the implications of these 
requirements and of the coordination processes they engage for the outcome-related aspect of 
our sense of agency for actions. In section 5, I discuss several factors that may modulate the 
agent-related aspect of experiences of joint agency. I conclude with some remarks on how an 
investigation of the experience of joint agency can also serve as an entry point into the nature 
of social reality.  
2. The Sense of Agency for Individual Actions: Sources and Mechanisms 
Empirical research on agency has explored a variety of potential cues to individual agency, 
and a number of different models of how the sense of agency for an action is generated have 
been proposed. These models all rely to a greater or lesser extent on a congruence principle: 
the sense of agency is produced when there is a match between cues x and y.  The points on 
which they differ concern the nature of the cues being compared, the nature of the processes 
involved in the production of the sense of agency, and how closely these processes are related 
to action production and control processes.  
Two theoretical positions define the two ends of the spectrum of possibilities: the motor 
prediction view and the cognitive reconstruction view. On the motor prediction view, the 
sense of agency is generated by processes dedicated to action control. On the cognitive 
reconstruction view, the sense of agency is generated by a general-purpose process of 
retrospective causal inference. 
The motor prediction view is inspired by computational theories of motor control. According 
to these theories, when the motor system generates a motor command, an efference copy of 
this command is sent to forward models whose role is to generate predictions about its 
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sensory consequences in advance of actual execution. The motor prediction view holds that 
the signals used for motor control also provide cues to agency  (Blakemore & Frith, 2003; 
Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000a, 2000b). In particular, it holds (1) that awareness of 
initiating an action is based on a representation of the predicted consequences of making that 
action, rather than its actual consequences, and on the congruence between the predicted state 
and the desired state, and (2) that for this experience of agency to continue, the predicted 
consequences also have to remain congruent with the sensory reafferences when they become 
available. The better the fit, the stronger the sense of agency people will experience.  
Claim (1) – and therefore the possibility that the sense of agency can emerge in advance of 
actual sensory effect and be based on premotor processes alone – is supported by evidence 
that awareness of initiating a movement in healthy subjects is reported by the agent between 
80-200 milliseconds before the movement actually occurs (Libet et al., 1983; Libet, 1985; 
Haggard & Eimer, 1999). It is also supported by evidence that this awareness is absent or 
delayed when the brain areas responsible for these predictions are temporarily disturbed using 
transcranial magnetic stimulation methods or are damaged (Haggard and Magno, 1999; 
Desmurget & Sirigu, 2009). Evidence for claim (2) – that the sense of agency also depends on 
the congruence between predictions and sensory reafferences – comes from studies showing 
that gradually disrupting the consequences of actions by introducing temporal delays or 
spatial inconsistencies gradually reduces the sense of agency (Fourneret & Jeannerod, 1998; 
Knoblich & Kircher, 2004; Knoblich, Stottmeister, & Kircher, 2004; Leube et al., 2003; Sato 
& Yasuda, 2005; Sato, 2009).  
The results of some of these studies also suggest that the motor system generates predictions 
at several levels of grain and that we need to distinguish between low-level sensorimotor 
predictions and reafferences and higher-level perceptual predictions and feedback (Gallagher, 
2007; Jeannerod, 2009; Knoblich & Repp, 2009; Pacherie, 2008, 2010). There are several 
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reasons to think that perceptual predictions may play a greater role than sensorimotor 
predictions in establishing agency for an action. First, the vast majority of our actions aim at 
producing effects in the environment and we normally attend to the perceptual effects of 
actions rather than to the exact movements we produce to achieve those effects. Second, 
experimental evidence suggest that people can make sizeable adjustments of their movements 
without being aware of doing so as long as the perceptual consequences of their movements 
are consistent with their goal (Fourneret and Jeannerod, 1998). Finally, several clinical 
populations present severe impairments of their sense of agency while retaining an intact 
capacity to make automatic online corrections of their movements (Jeannerod, 2009; Fletcher 
& Frith, 2009). It may therefore be that perceptual cues rather than sensorimotor cues are 
crucial to the sense of agency. Or, alternatively, it may be that our awareness of what we are 
doing relies essentially on perceptual cues, while our awareness that we are acting is 
influenced by both kinds of cues.  
In contrast to the motor prediction view, the cognitive reconstruction view downplays the 
contribution of the motor system to the sense of agency and proposes that it is inferred 
retrospectively from the existence of a match between a prior thought and an observed action 
rather than predictively.  Thus, on Wegner's theory of apparent mental causation (Wegner, 
2002), a general-purpose causal inference process is at play. If an action is consistent with a 
prior thought of the agent and other potential causes of the action are not present or salient, a 
sense of agency for the action will be induced.  
There is also empirical evidence that high-level inferential processes play a role in 
determining the sense of agency for an action. Studies of Wegner and colleagues have 
demonstrated that cognitive cues can alter the sense of agency for an action independently of 
changes in sensorimotor and perceptual cues. For instance, consciously or subliminally 
priming an outcome can enhance the sense of agency for that outcome or even induce an 
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illusory sense of agency for an outcome one had no control over (Wegner & Wheatley, 1999; 
Wegner, Sparrow, & Winerman, 2004; Aarts, Custers, & Wegner, 2005; Aarts, Custer, & 
Marien, 2009).  
There is now a growing consensus that the motor prediction view and the cognitive 
reconstruction view are not mutually exclusive but complementary and that intrinsic cues 
(cues provided by the motor system) and extrinsic cues (such as cognitive primes) both 
contribute to the sense of agency (Bayne & Pacherie, 2007; Gallagher, 2007; Knoblich & 
Repp, 2009; Pacherie, 2008; Sato, 2009; Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008; Moore, 
Wegner and Haggard; 2009; Moore & Fletcher, 2012).  
One way to try and combine the two approaches is to appeal to the distinction between pre-
reflective experiences or feelings of agency and reflective judgments of agency proposed by 
several authors (Bayne & Pacherie, 2007; Gallagher, 2007; Haggard & Tsakiris, 2009; 
Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008) and to argue that while motor processes contribute 
mainly to feelings of agency, interpretive processes contribute mainly to judgments of agency. 
This conceptual distinction is echoed methodologically in the ways agency is measured in 
experimental studies. Some studies (Farrer et al., 2003; Metcalfe & Greene, 2007; Sato & 
Yasuda, 2005; Wegner & Wheatley, 1999) investigate agency by asking participants to 
explicitly judge whether they caused a particular sensory event (e.g., by answering questions 
such as "Did you produce the movement you saw?" or "Did you produce the sound you 
heard?"). Other studies use implicit agency measures such as intentional binding and sensory 
suppression. Intentional binding is a phenomenon, first reported by Patrick Haggard and his 
colleagues (Haggard, Clark & Kalogeras, 2002), whereby a voluntary action and its external 
sensory consequences are compressed together in subjective time. As intentional binding 
occurs only in situations in which the participant is an agent (Engbert, Wohlschlaeger, & 
Haggard, 2008; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2003) and is furthermore modulated by the statistical 
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relation between events (Moore & Haggard, 2008; Moore et al., 2009), it is considered to 
provide an implicit measure of agency. Sensory attenuation of self-produced action effects 
has also been used as an implicit measure of agency.  Sensory attenuation has been suggested 
to result from a comparison of the internally generated motor predictions about the sensory 
consequences of one’s ongoing actions with their actual sensory consequences. When they are 
congruent, the sensory percept is attenuated, thereby enabling a differentiation between self-
generated and externally generated sensory events (Blakemore, Wolpert & Frith, 2002; 
Cullen, 2004). Several studies have confirmed the existence of sensory attenuation effects in 
the tactile, visual and auditory domains (e.g., Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2000; Bays & 
Wolpert, 2007; Cardoso-Leite, Mamassian, Schütz-Bosbach & Waszak, 2010, Aliu, Houdé & 
Nagarajan, 2011). However, recent studies showing that prior authorships beliefs, or even 
monetary gains and losses (Takahata et al., 2012), can modulate both sensory attenuation and 
intentional binding (Desantis, Roussel & Waszak, 2011; Desantis et al., 2012), suggest that 
drawing a sharp distinction between feelings of agency supported by motor processes and 
judgments of agency supported by interpretive processes may be over-simplistic. 
D!6%+/$&$-0!.66%+.*1!$&!'+!.66).:!'+!.!E.4)&$.-!$-')0%.'$2)!3%./)<+%F!$-2+:2$-0!.!1$)%.%*14!+3!
6%),$*'$+-!.-,!/+,):!GH$:,$-0!I#:)'*1)%!J!#%$'1(!=KKLM!N.*1)%$)(!=KKCM!O++%)!J!#:)'*1)%(!=K"=P8!
Q1H&(!Fletcher and Frith (2009) propose that the sense of agency is determined by a Bayesian 
process of cue integration, where the predictions generated a higher levels of the hierarchy 
provide the priors for the lower levels; i.e. constrain the interpretation of cues available at 
lower levels. In this model, cue integration is itself the product of both the strength of the 
priors and the weights attached to the available cues.
1
 These weights are themselves a 
function of the reliability of these different cues, which may vary from context to context 
(Synofzik, Vosgerau, and Newen, 2008; Hendricks, Wiggers, Jonker, & Haselager, 2007; 
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Lau, Rogers, & Passingham, 2007; Moore, Wegner, and Haggard, 2009; Moore & Fletcher, 
2012). When priors are weak – for, instance I am quite unsure what the effects of my pressing 
down this button will be –, I may still have a strong sense of agency for the ensuing 
consequence, provided that perceptual reafferences carrying information about it are very 
reliable. Conversely, if my priors are very robust, I may have a strong sense that I produced a 
certain effect in the world, even though the feedback I get is weak or ambiguous. When both 
priors and reafferent cues are weak, my sense of agency may be correspondingly weakened. 
While this Bayesian approach does not allow for a sharp distinction between agentive 
experiences and agentive judgments, it can accommodate the idea that priors exert more 
influence on agentive judgments than on agentive experiences.   
3. Joint actions: coordination requirements and how to meet them 
For joint actions to be performed successfully, it is not enough that agents control their own 
actions; i.e., correctly predict their effects and make adjustments if needed (self-predictions 
and self-adjustments). They must also coordinate their actions with those of their co-agents so 
as to achieve their joint goal. For that they must represent their partner's actions and predict 
their expected consequences (other-predictions) and use these predictions to adjust what they 
are doing to what others are doing (dyadic adjustments). While dyadic adjustments are 
necessary for joint action, they are not yet sufficient. For example, the film Enemy at the 
Gates, where a Russian sniper and a German sniper play a game of cat-and-mouse during the 
Battle of Stalingrad, provides a vivid illustration of a sophisticated mutual adjustment of 
intentions and actions. Obviously, the two snipers in the film are not cooperating; theirs is a 
deadly competition. What is furthermore required in the case of joint action is that 
participating agents share a goal and understand the combined impact of their respective 
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intentions and actions on their joint goal and adjust them accordingly. To do that, they must 
be able to represent the combined effects of their actions and those of their partners (joint-
predictions) and use their predictions of these joint effects to monitor progress towards the 
joint goal and decide on their next moves (triadic adjustments). 
Philosophical accounts of joint action (Bratman, 1992, 2009; Gilbert, 1992, 2009; Tuomela, 
2007) are typically concerned with the processes involved in making decisions about whether 
or not to act together and in long-range planning. Their focus is on the coordination of agent's 
intentions prior to acting, but they pay little heed to the perceptual, cognitive, and motor 
mechanisms enabling people to coordinate online. In contrast, during the last decade, 
cognitive scientists have investigated joint action by focusing on online coordination 
processes in relatively simple joint tasks and on the factors that affect these coordination 
processes. These two sets of processes are not completely independent, however. For 
instance, whether people decide to act together often depends at least in part on the nature of 
the coordination to be achieved and on their expectations regarding their capacity to 
coordinate online. Conversely, there is evidence that low-level coordination (e.g., in the form 
of bodily synchronization) has an effect on how people perceive social interactions and those 
they interact with (Chartrand and van Baaren, 2009; Farmer & Tsakiris, 2012; Hove & Risen, 
2009; Miles et al., 2009; van Baaren et al., 2009) and can foster cooperation within groups by 
strengthening feelings of social affiliation and group cohesion (Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009). 
In addition, it seems likely that our sense of agency for a joint action may depend to a large 
extent on how well co-agents coordinate online. For instance, although we may have formed a 
shared intention to spend the afternoon rowing on the Thames and have meshing subplans for 
our joint goal, our sense of agency for the joint action will probably be quite weak if we are 
! ""!
unable to coordinate our movements precisely when rowing. It is therefore important to 
understand what kind of processes may support online coordination. 
In recent years, cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists have made much progress in 
understanding the perceptual, cognitive, and motor mechanisms and processes that enable 
individuals to coordinate their actions with others online as well as the neural basis of these 
mechanisms. In a recent review of psychological research on joint action, Knoblich, Butterfill 
and Sebanz (2011) distinguish between two types of coordination, emergent coordination and 
planned coordination.
2
 In emergent coordination, coordinated behavior occurs due to 
perception-action couplings that make multiple individuals act in a similar way. In planned 
coordination, agents plan their own actions in relation to the joint goal and to their partners' 
actions.  
While emergent coordination can occur between individuals who have no plans to act jointly, 
it is also a key facilitator of joint action. Emergent coordination processes include 
interpersonal entrainment, affordances, perception-action matching and action simulation.  
Entrainment is a process whereby two people involuntarily synchronize their behavior, even 
in the absence of direct mechanical coupling. Thus, two people sitting next to each other in 
rocking chairs will unconsciously synchronize their rocking frequency and do so even when 
they have chairs with different eigenfrequencies (Richardson et al., 2007b). Similarly, two 
individuals who are asked to tap at a confortable tempo strongly tend to spontaneously fall 
into synchrony (Oullier et al., 2008).  
The perception of common or joint affordances may also be one process through which 
emergent coordination can be achieved (Richardson et al., 2007a). For instance, if it starts 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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papers in the special issue on joint action, guest-edited by Sukhvinder S. Obhi and Natalie Sebanz, in 
Experimental Brain Research, vol. 211, issues 3-4, June 2011.!!
! "=!
raining, the people in a park may spontaneously converge on the kiosk that affords protection 
from the rain. The kiosk that can shelter many people would constitute a common affordance. 
A joint affordance is a case where an object affords action to two people that it may not afford 
to each of them individually. Thus, a seesaw may provide great fun to two kids riding it, but 
not to a single child. 
A third process than can induce emergent coordination is perception-action matching. A 
number of recent theories—the common coding theory (Prinz, 1997), the motor simulation 
theory (Jeannerod, 1997, 2006), and the motor resonance theory (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 
2004) postulate an interface between perception and action such that the perception of an 
action leads to the activation of a corresponding action representation in the observer’s action 
system. These theoretical insights are supported by a wealth of empirical findings, from 
single-cell studies in monkeys (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Rizzolatti, 
Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996) to brain imaging studies in humans (Decety & Grezes, 
1999, 2006; Calvo-Merino et al., 2005).  
A fourth related process of emergent coordination is action simulation, where, when watching 
someone else acting, an observer can use the predictive models in his own motor system to 
anticipate the timing and outcomes of the observed actions (Knoblich & Sebanz, 2008). Both 
perception-action matching and action simulation can lead to emergent coordination by 
inducing the same action tendencies in agents who observe one another's action.  
In planned coordination, agents plan their own actions in relation to the joint goal and to a 
greater or lesser extent their partners' actions. The extent to which one represents and take 
into account one's partner's intentions and actions may vary greatly according to the task. For 
instance, to prepare a meal together, we must first decide what the menu will be and who will 
prepare what, but while preparing the dinner it may be unnecessary to form detailed 
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representations of what the other is doing. It is enough that we coordinate our actions so as to 
avoid needing the same kitchen utensils at the same time and avoid bumping into one another 
while moving around in the kitchen. In other cases, where the precise coordination of the 
agent's respective actions is required for successful performance, it may be important to form 
detailed representations of others' actions and their consequences. For example, two people 
moving furniture together or playing doubles in tennis had better form precise representations 
of their partner's actions and their consequences.  
As emphasized by Knoblich, Butterfill and Sebanz (2011), shared task representations play an 
important role in planned coordination. Shared task representations do not only specify in 
advance what the respective tasks of each of the co-agents are, they also provide control 
structures that allow agents to monitor and predict what their partners are doing, thus enabling 
interpersonal coordination in real time. Empirical evidence shows that having shared task 
representations influences perceptual information processing, action monitoring, control and 
prediction during the ensuing interaction (Heed et al., 2010; Schuch & Tipper, 2007; Sebanz 
et al., 2006b; Tsai et al., 2006). Furthermore, several studies (Sebanz et al., 2005; Sebanz et 
al., 2006b, 2007) have shown that actors may form shared representations of tasks quasi-
automatically, even when it is more effective to ignore one another.  
Several researchers have also suggested that joint attention provides a basic 
mechanism for sharing representations of objects and events and thus for creating a 
“perceptual common ground” in joint action (Tomasello, 1995, 1999; Tomasello & Carpenter, 
2007; Tollefsen, 2005; Sebanz et al., 2006a). To act jointly, it is often necessary not only that 
the co-agents identify the objects to be acted upon, their location as well as the location of 
possible obstacles, but also be mutually aware that they do. The phenomenon of joint 
attention involves more than just two people attending to the same object or event. In 
! "?!
addition, there must be some causal connection between the two subjects’ acts of attending 
(causal coordination) and each subject must be aware, in some sense, of the object as an 
object that is present to both; in other words the fact that both are attending to the same object 
or event should be open or mutually manifest (mutual manifestness). Joint attention may thus 
play an important role in ensuring that coagents track the same objects and features of the 
situation and be mutually aware that they do. In a recent study, Böckler et al. (2011) showed 
that attending to objects together from opposite perspectives makes people adopt an 
allocentric rather than the default egocentric frame of reference. These authors suggest that 
taking an allocentric reference frame facilitates object processing for objects that are turned 
towards the other and may support the efficiency of joint actions from different spatial 
orientations. 
Independently of mutual manifestness, being able to assess what others are perceiving, 
or can or cannot perceive at a given moment in time may also facilitate coordination. For 
instance, a study by Brennan and colleagues (Brennan et al., 2007) demonstrated that co-
agents in joint visual search space were able to distribute a common space between them by 
directing their attention depending on where the other was looking and that their joint search 
performance was thus much more efficient than their performance in an individual version of 
the search task.  
As pointed out by Knoblich, Butterfill and Sebanz (2011), to enable efficient joint 
action, emergent and planned coordination must work together, as there are complementary 
limits on what each can achieve. A series of recent studies provides evidence that planned 
coordination modulates emergent coordination, with top-down modulation of entrainment 
through joint action plans (Kirschner & Tomasello, 2009) and the activation of simulation for 
co-actors but not for agents acting independently (Kourtis, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2010). 
Conversely, emergent coordination can also modulate planned coordination either directly as 
! "@!
when the presence of a joint affordance causes people to switch from individual to joint action 
or indirectly as when entrainment and motor synchronization fosters cooperation within 
groups by strengthening group cohesion.  Thus, Wiltermuth & Heath (2009) had participants 
in an experiment play a public goods game – the Weak Link Coordination Exercise, where 
different amounts of cooperation and free riding are possible –, after taking them on walks 
around campus, either in a synchronous condition, where they had to walk in step or in an 
asynchronous condition, where they walked normally. Participants who had walked in step 
cooperated more than those in the asynchronous condition. They also indicated stronger 
feelings of connection with and trust in their counterparts than did those in the asynchronous 
condition.  
Although an important research effort is still needed to understand in detail how 
various coordination processes interact and what factors modulate the activation of these 
processes, we now already know enough about these processes to start asking the question 
how they might also contribute to the phenomenology of joint agency. To this issue I now 
turn. 
4. Strength of the sense of agency for joint action 
The discussion that follows is premised on the idea that, as is the case with individual actions, 
the sense of agency we experience for joint action relies on a multiplicity of cues related to 
different levels of action specification and control. However, the mechanisms of action 
specification and control involved in joint action are typically more complex than those 
present in individual actions. Thus, to understand how the phenomenology of joint action 
might differ from the phenomenology of individual actions, we need to take into account the 
specific coordination requirements that bear on joint actions. In the previous section, I 
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discussed these requirements as well as a range of cognitive processes that may help us meet 
them. 
In an investigation of the phenomenology of joint agency, we should consider the 
issue of what factors influence the strength or intensity of the sense of agency one experiences 
when engaged in joint action. However, a second issue also arises: what form does the sense 
of agency take and why? That is, to what extent is agency experienced as self-agency or as 
we-agency? In the remainder of this section, I concentrate on the first issue. The second issue 
is discussed in the next section.  
In individual actions, the strength of the sense of agency one has for an action depends 
on how good the matches are between the predictions we make about the consequences of our 
actions at the cognitive, perceptual and sensorimotor levels and their actual consequences. 
The same principle of congruence presumably applies for joint actions. However, as we saw 
in the previous section, in joint actions, prediction becomes a much more complex task. 
Agents must not just predict the consequences of their own actions at all three levels of action 
specification (self-predictions), they must also do the same for the actions of their co-agents 
(other-predictions), and finally integrate both self- and other-predictions to build predictions 
about the joint consequences of their combined actions (joint predictions). The strength of the 
sense of agency for the joint outcome will depend on how accurately one is able to make joint 
predictions, which in turn depends on the extent and accuracy of self- and other-predictions 
and on the manner of their integration. 
One’s success at making joint predictions depends on a range of cognitive processes 
described in the previous section but also on the accessibility of relevant information. This 
accessibility in turn depends on the nature of the joint action. Factors such as the structure of 
the joint action, its scale, the degrees of specialization of agents' roles, and the longevity or 
transience of the collective all affect the accessibility of relevant information.  
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The structure of joint actions can range from the strictly egalitarian, where all 
participating agents contribute more or less equally to the joint action and are equally 
responsible for planning it and controlling its successful execution, to the highly hierarchical, 
where planning, monitoring, and control are responsibilities assigned to agents high in the 
hierarchy. In egalitarian joint actions, the choice of the joint goal and the planning for this 
joint goal are all negotiated among the co-agents, thus ensuring that they all have a relatively 
good knowledge of what the tasks of others are and of how they jointly contribute to the total 
outcome. This shared knowledge makes them well prepared to make reasonably accurate 
other- and joint predictions at least at the cognitive level. In contrast, in hierarchical joint 
actions, the choice of joint goals and the planning of the joint action are the concern of agents 
high in the hierarchy. Agents down the hierarchy typically lack detailed knowledge of the 
overall plans of the tasks of their co-workers. As a result of this knowledge asymmetry, 
agents at the top of the hierarchy, but not agents lower down, will be in a good position to 
make accurate other- and joint predictions. 
A second important factor is scale. In small-scale joint actions, typically taking place 
in a shared physical environment, agents are in a position to monitor what all or most of their 
co-agents are doing or about to do and what the consequences of their actions are, and they 
thus have access to the perceptual information needed to make accurate online other- and joint 
predictions. In larger scale actions, in contrast, there may be too many participants for such a 
comprehensive monitoring to be feasible. Co-agents have only partial access to what others 
are doing and to what the joint outcomes of their actions are. To take an extreme example, 
think of the Allied landing in Normandy in June 1944. The individual soldier crawling on 
Omaha Beach in the midst of gunfire probably had very little inkling of what was going on at 
a broader scale and wasn’t in a position to assess whether the landing as a whole was 
progressing satisfactorily. 
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A third factor to consider is the distribution of roles. In joint actions where participants 
have near-identical or interchangeable roles, they may have a motor repertoire allowing them 
to engage in perception-action matching and motor simulation as well as the knowledge 
needed to form task-representations; they would thus be in a position to precisely represent 
the goals and actions of their co-agents and make accurate other- and joint predictions. In 
joint actions where roles are specialized and highly differentiated, this knowledge may be 
missing.  
Finally, a fourth factor that may mitigate the effects of highly differentiated roles is 
the stability of the association among co-agents. Agents forming a long-term collective and 
used to acting together will have had the opportunity to form shared-task representations and 
will typically be better able to predict the actions of their co-agents and their consequences, 
even when roles are highly differentiated, than members of a newly formed collective. 
In a nutshell, then, if the strength of the sense of agency for a joint action depends not 
just on self-prediction but also on other-predictions and on the joint predictions resulting from 
the integration of both self- and other-predictions, then participation in small-scale, egalitarian 
actions, with little specialization of roles and a stable group of co-agents, is likely to yield a 
stronger sense of agency than first-time participation in a large-scale, hierarchical joint action 
with highly differentiated roles. Furthermore, for joint actions of the latter kind, the strength 
of the sense of agency experienced would depend on the position one occupies in the 
hierarchy. The higher up one stands in the hierarchy, typically the better one knows how roles 
are distributed and how the co-agents contributions fit together to yield a joint outcome. The 
stronger therefore, one's sense of agency for this joint outcome should be. Whether the greater 
sense of agency enjoyed by agents higher up in the hierarchy takes the form of stronger 
agency judgments, stronger feelings of agency or both may depend on the mode of 
involvement of these agents in the action and on the more or less direct ways in which they 
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can monitor and control the joint action. For instance, one may want to contrast the case of 
the orchestra conductor on his podium who directly issues his commands to the musicians and 
gets immediate feedback from them from the case of the modern general in his headquarters 
whose access to what is going on in the battle field is much more indirect. In the conductor's 
case, the monitoring and control loop remains strongly embodied as his commands are issued 
through the medium of gestures and his monitoring of the joint action operates through visual 
and auditory channels. His increased sense of agency may thus not just take the form of 
stronger agentive judgments than the musicians sitting in the orchestra but also of an 
enhanced agentive experience. In contrast, the general commanding and monitoring 
operations from afar will probably form stronger judgments of agency for the battle and its 
outcome than the mere private but it is unclear whether this increase will be echoed at the 
level of his agentive experience.  
One should note, in addition, that whereas in individual actions prediction and control 
tend to go hand in hand, in joint actions their relationship is much less linear. In individual 
action, agents’ predictions concern the consequences of their actions and are used to select 
actions, control their course, and make adjustments to them if needed. The fit between 
prediction and control is not perfect, and experiences of illusionary control can still arise as 
shown by some of the experiments discussed in section 2, but on the whole accurate 
predictions tend to be reliable indicators that the agent controls the action. Thus, the more 
accurate they are, the stronger the sense of self-agency should be. In joint actions, however, 
the predictions agents need to make pertain not just to the consequences of their own actions 
but also to the consequences of others’ actions and to their combined effects. The extent to 
which one might be able to predict the consequences of others’ actions need not always 
parallel the extent to which one might be able to control their actions. While we can exert 
direct motor and executive control over our own actions, control over the actions of others is 
! =K!
perforce indirect and limited. If co-actors are part of a hierarchy and one has authority over 
the other, she can control his actions through verbal commands or gestures (e.g., the orchestra 
conductor) but not the other way round. Even outside hierarchical settings, one may to some 
extent be able to steer the behavior of one's co-actor(s) either verbally or though action. If we 
are taking a walk together and I arrive first to the street corner, I may control the direction we 
take, right or left. If we are carrying together a heavy peace of furniture and you are walking 
faster than I expected, I may force you to slow down by slowing down myself.  
As a result of the loosening of the link between prediction and control, joint actions 
leave much more room for spurious experiences of control. I may have the impression that I 
control your behavior, not because I actually control it, but simply because I am able to 
accurately predict it. At the same time, this tendency to experience spurious control over a 
joint action, may, to some extent, be counterbalanced by the knowledge we normally have 
that we are not acting alone. 
Second, and pulling in the other direction, matches between our predictions of the 
outcomes of others' actions and their actual outcomes may not be as good as matches between 
our predictions of the consequences of our own actions and their outcomes. To the extent that 
the sense of agency relies on the goodness of the match between predicted and actual 
consequences of actions as specified at the sensorimotor level, then, as pointed out by van der 
Wel, Sebanz and Knoblich (2012), the sense of agency should be weaker for joint action, 
since, on the one hand, the link between one's motor commands and their sensory 
consequences is less clear as a result of the perturbations that may be introduced by what the 
co-actor does, and, on the other hand, we have no direct access to the sensorimotor  
reafferences others get when acting and thus no way to make precise comparisons between 
predictions we make about the sensory consequences of their actions and their actual sensory 
consequences. However, as we saw in section 2, there are reasons to think that perceptual 
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predictions may play a greater role than sensorimotor predictions in establishing agency for 
an action. With respect to predictions made at the perceptual level, agents normally have 
access to information about the perceptual consequences of others' actions and are in a 
position to compare them with what they had expected these perceptual consequences to be. 
The goodness of the match, hence the strength of the sense of agency one would experience, 
would depend on how well others perform, as the perceptual consequences of actions are 
easier to predict the better people perform.
3
 In addition to the intrinsic quality of the 
performance, another important factor would be its timing, since, as we saw in section 2, 
temporal distortions between predicted and actual outcome tend to reduce the sense of 
agency. Different individuals often have different temporal signatures. For instance, the 
spontaneous walking pace of people can present important inter-individual variations. These 
idiosyncratic differences could contribute to reduce the accuracy of predictions. However, 
they may be compensated in turn by emergent forms of coordination. Thus, synchronization 
through motor entrainment may induce temporal interpersonal alignment and thus improve 
the temporal accuracy of predictions. 
5. Agentive identity: Self-Agency vs. We-Agency 
What actions one can perform and what effects one can voluntarily bring about define 
what we may call the scope of one's agency. This scope can vary from agent to agent or vary 
within the same agent according to age, acquired skills, available instruments, and 
institutional empowerments. Some agents can perform actions and bring about effects that 
others can’t. For instance, some people can do a cartwheel or play the violin while others 
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>!Models of motor control are typically based on optimality principles (For a review, see Todorov, 
2004). Very roughly, skilled performance on a certain task is performance that minimizes the total 
energy cost to the system. It has been proposed that optimality is also what guides our assessment of 
actions performed by others. Thus, according to the teleological stance advocated by Csibra and 
Gergely (2007), our evaluation of the quality of actions is based on an assessment of the relative 
efficiency of the action performed to achieve the goal within the situational constraints given.!!
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can’t. Learning new skills is a way of enlarging the scope of one's agency and thus agents 
may be able to do things at some stage of their life that they couldn't do before they had 
mastered the relevant skills. Agents may be able to do things with the help of instruments that 
they couldn’t do without. Agents may also be able to do things when empowered by relevant 
institutions that they couldn’t do if not so empowered, like marrying couples or hiring new 
employees. The widening of the scope of one’s agency appears as a form of self-enlargement 
involving boundary expansion and, indeed, in some instances quite literally so. For example, 
many human and monkey studies have shown that brain representations of peripersonal space, 
that is, the surrounding space encompassing objects within reach, are quite plastic and that the 
use of tools allowing one to reach further in space results in a recoding of far space as near 
(Iriki et al., 1996; Farné & Làdavas, 2000). 
In many cases, acting jointly allows us to bring about outcomes that a single agent 
could not—or could not easily—bring about on his or her own. For instance, two people may 
be able to lift together a heavy object that neither could lift alone, or a team of construction 
workers may build a house much more efficiently than a single individual. Acting jointly is 
thus one way of increasing agency scope. But is increased agency then experienced as self-
agency, an expansion of the boundaries of one's self-agency, or as we-agency, a merging of 
one's agency in the collective agency of the group? We may call this the question of agentive 
identity in joint action.  
What form agentive identity takes depends on the extent to which the conditions 
needed for self-other discrimination obtain. These conditions themselves may be roughly 
distinguished into, on the one hand, structural conditions, i.e., factors relating to the structural 
properties of the joint action, such as its more or less pronounced hierarchical organization 
and division of labor among agents, and, on the other hand, motivational conditions, the latter 
! =>!
encompassing both the reasons that motivated the agent to engage in a given joint action in 
the first place and the motivational effects of the action itself. 
In section 2, we have seen that in individual actions one's sense of self-agency 
depends to a large extent on the degree of match between one's predictions about the effects 
of our actions and their actual effects. In joint action, however, it is also important that we 
make predictions about the effects of other actions to facilitate coordination and yet 
differentiate between self and other to avoid interference effects and conflicts  (Sebanz, 
Bekkering & Knoblich, 2006; Wenke et al., 2011). Thus, in joint action contexts, agents may 
be confronted with increased self-other discrimination demands while, at the same time, some 
of the main cues used in individual action contexts, namely matches between predicted and 
actual consequences, become much less reliable indicators of self-agency. However, the 
severity of the challenge may well depend on the structural properties of the action. 
It seems that the less differentiated the respective contributions of co-agents, the 
greater the challenge of self-other discrimination and hence the more likely that a sense of 
we-agency could arise. In joint action, agents make their own contribution to the joint goal 
but must also coordinate with others (dyadic adjustments) and coordinate with others with 
respect to the joint goal (triadic adjustments). Contributions to the joint outcome may be 
important or marginal and coordination relations may be symmetrical or asymmetrical. The 
more commensurate the respective contributions of the co-agents and the more symmetrical 
the coordination relations among them are (or are perceived to be), the more likely it is that 
the sense of agency they will experience will involve a shift towards a sense of we-agency.  
Other things being equal, participation in egalitarian joint actions is more likely to 
give rise to a sense of we-agency than participation in a hierarchically structured action. In 
hierarchical actions, agents high in the hierarchy can have more influence on the joint 
outcome than agents lower down the hierarchy, and coordination relations are highly 
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asymmetrical with agents at the top of the hierarchy coordinating while agents down the 
hierarchy are being coordinated. High-ranking agents, on the one hand, are likely to 
experience a sense of personal enlargement, understood as an enhanced sense of self-agency 
rather than a sense of we-agency and to regard other participants as social tools rather than co-
agents. Low-ranking agents, on the other hand, may well experience a shrinking sense of self-
agency without the compensation of a robust sense of we-agency. 
There are many intermediate situations, however, where one's experienced sense of 
agency can be a mix of self-agency and we-agency, and there are several factors that may 
further modulate the experience. A group of agents may contribute equally to a joint goal and 
yet have specialized roles that allow them to keep a strong sense of self-agency at the same 
time they experience a sense of we agency. Think, for instance, of the goalkeeper in a soccer 
team, who may experience a strong sense of we-agency for the team's victory, while retaining 
a strong sense of self-agency for stopping a penalty and thus contributing to this victory.  
In addition, very small perturbations in the relative salience of co-agents can influence 
our perception of the importance of their contribution to the joint action. Wegner and Sparrow 
(2007) discuss results from social psychology experiments showing such effects. Thus, a 
person wearing a brightly colored shirt is more likely to be held responsible for the direction 
of a group discussion than someone dressed so as to blend in, even if these individuals’ 
contributions are the same (McArthur & Post, 1977). Similarly, the physical perspective from 
which co-actors are seen influences the perceived importance of their contribution. Looking at 
someone face-on rather than looking over the person’s shoulder will incline us to attribute to 
that person a greater responsibility for the action (Taylor & Fiske, 1978). Wegner and 
Sparrow (2007) also report findings from their own experiments showing that small variations 
in the timing of action and gaze appear to influence judgments of authorship for the joint 
action. Thus, when two people are acting together, the person who moves first, be it by a split 
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second, will tend to be seen as the leader of this segment of their action and will experience 
greater authorship of it.  
A recent study by Obhi and Hall (2011) suggests that this mix of self-agency and we-
agency can also take the form of a dissociation between explicit and implicit measures of 
agency. In their experiment, they determined intentional binding, used as an implicit measure 
of agency, and compared it to explicit judgments of agency for effects following from jointly 
produced actions that were initiated by one of two co-actors. While only the initiator of the 
action explicitly judged that he or she was causally responsible for the production of the 
effect, both agents demonstrated significant and indistinguishable intentional binding. The 
authors tentatively suggest that the presence of intentional binding in both agents might 
constitute evidence that when two individuals are involved in a joint action context, they 
automatically form a new agentive identity, a 'we' identity, at the pre-reflective level. In 
contrast, at the reflective level they would retain a sense of their identity qua independent 
entities and this would be reflected in their agency judgments.  
In another recent study, Weiss, Herwig & Schütz-Bosbach (2011) investigated the influence 
of social interactions on sensory attenuation of action effects, a phenomenon that has also 
been used as an implicit measure of agency. They compared the attenuation of the perceived 
loudness intensity of auditory action effects (i.e. tones generated by a button press) performed 
either by oneself or another person in an individual, non-interactive action context or in an 
interactive action context. In the individual conditions, the participants either performed a 
tone-eliciting button press or observed the experimenter doing this. In the interactive 
conditions, the participants either performed a tone-eliciting button press whenever the 
experimenter requested them to do so by touching their right forearm or, conversely, the 
experimenter performed the tone-eliciting button press whenever the participants requested 
him to do so by touching his right forearm. Consistent with previous evidence, the perceived 
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loudness of self-generated sounds was attenuated compared to sounds generated by another 
person. However, sensory attenuation of both self- and other-generated sounds was also 
significantly increased in interactive conditions, as compared to the respective individual 
action contexts. In contrast to Obhi and Hall (2011), the authors of this study do not interpret 
their results as evidence for the formation of a new implicit 'we' agentive identity. Rather, 
they interpret increased sensory attenuation in the participants when the other person was 
acting on their request as a marker of increased self-agency and enlarged agency scope, where 
the other person becomes an integral part of the participant's own internal sensorimotor loop. 
Similarly, they suggest that the stronger attenuation of sounds resulting from the participant's 
own button press when acting on request rather than of his own accord might be due to a form 
of contrastive enhancement of self-agency.  
Given the very limited number of studies on the sense of agency in joint action, it is certainly 
premature to draw strong conclusions. While both studies demonstrate an effect of interactive 
or joint action contexts on implicit measures of agency, it is unclear whether this effect is best 
interpreted as a shift towards we-agency or as an enhancement of self-agency, either by proxy 
or in contrastive fashion. It is also unclear whether the dissociation found by Obhi and Hall 
(2011) between pre-reflective and reflective sense of agency should be taken as evidence that 
they rely on largely independent processes or that the processes determining pre-reflective 
agency are immune to top-down influence. On the contrary, it may be that knowledge that one 
is acting together with someone else exerts a top-down effect on how the agency cues used in 
implicit agency registration are weighted. Finally, we should not necessarily assume that 
when pre-reflective and reflective sense of agency dissociate, we-agency will always be found 
at the pre-reflective rather than at the reflective level. 
It is important to note, for instance, that the participants in the study by Obhi and Hall 
(2011) had asymmetric roles, initiator and follower, and clear perceptual information about 
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who had been the initiator and who the follower. It may be therefore that in joint action 
contexts where no such disambiguating information is present, explicit agency judgments 
reflect a mixed agentive identity. To my knowledge, this possibility has not yet been 
empirically tested. When asking subjects to report their sense of agency for a joint action, 
typically experimenters tacitly assume that they are measuring self-agency. Yet, their results 
may be open to other interpretations. For instance, in a recent study where two agents had to 
coordinate their actions to rotate a pole that moved along a fixed axis, van der Wel, Sebanz 
and Knoblich (2012) found that the sum of the agency ratings participants provided after joint 
performance on average exceeded a value of 100, on a scale from 0 to 100. If these ratings are 
thought to reflect the sense of self-agency of the participants, then one may conclude, as the 
authors of this study tentatively do, that participants had a general bias to claim more control 
over the joint action than they objectively had. Alternatively, however, the sense of agency 
reported by the participants may have reflected a mix of self- and we-agency.   
A complete shift towards pure we-agency may perhaps only be observed in very specific 
forms of joint activity such as military drill and communal dancing, that are explored by the 
military historian William H. McNeill in his 1995 book Keeping Together in Time: Dance 
and Drill in Human History. McNeill describes the experience of participants in traditional 
communal dancing and his own experience when subjected to endless military drill in the 
army as involving a shift in agentive identity: 
“Boundary loss” is the individual and “feeling they are one” is the collective 
way of looking at the same thing: a blurring of self-awareness and the 
heightening of fellow-feeling with all who share in the dance. It matches my 
own recollection of what close-order drill felt like… (1995: 8) 
The more similar the actions co-agents perform, the more similar their effects and the 
more synchronous their timing, the greater the similarity of self- and other-predictions will be 
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and thus the harder the differentiation of self- and other-agency and the preservation of self-
boundaries. If, in addition, social identity is made very salient at the expense of individual 
identity, all the conditions are met for a merging of the individual into the collective. 
McNeil’s description of military drilling presents all these ingredients. The point of drilling is 
to get the soldiers to perform the very same actions at exactly the same time. To make self-
differentiation even more difficult, the military also imposes uniform dress and hair grooming 
standards on their soldiers. The soldiers are also constantly reminded that qua individuals they 
are nothing outside of their status as members of the US army. The military does not do all of 
this inadvertently of course. Its aim is to instill esprit de corps into the recruits and, for better 
or worse, it seems to have found a very effective recipe: maximize predictability and 
minimize differentiability by maximizing similarity at all levels. 
In addition to structural factors, but also in interaction with them, motivational factors 
can also contribute to shaping the form agentive identity takes in joint action. On the one 
hand, the very motivations that lead an agent to engage in joint action may influence the way 
agency will be experienced. We sometimes engage in joint action because acting jointly with 
others is a more efficient way of promoting our own individual interests, but we also engage 
in joint action on the basis of pro-social motivations, i.e. for the benefit of the group rather 
than for our own individual benefit. In the classical stag hunt scenario, a group of hunters who 
decide to hunt a stag together rather than each hunt a hare on his own are motivated by self-
interest: each will get more food from his share of the stag than from a hare. Contrast this 
with the case where these hunters are members of the same clan and are hunting the stag to 
provide meat for a banquet the clan is organizing. In the latter case, the hunters are acting on 
behalf of the clan and the ultimate goal pursued is a group goal. A form of social or group 
identity is thus salient from the outset and may influence the way agency is experienced.  
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In addition, there is also an increasing body of evidence showing a bi-directional 
relationship between shared social identity and motor synchrony, action-co-representation and 
cooperativeness. On the one hand, there considerable evidence from social psychology that 
people are more willing to trust and cooperate with in-group members than with out-group 
members (Brewer, 2007; Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Taifel, 1970; Wit & Kerr, 2002); there is 
also evidence that actions are co-represented less when one's co-actor is an out-group member 
than when he or she is an in-group member (Müller et al., 2011) and that group membership 
modulates nonconscious behavioral mimicry (Lakin et al.; 2003; Yabar et al., 2006). On the 
other hand, there is also strong empirical evidence that nonconscious behavioral mimicry and 
motor synchrony promote positive relationships (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999), increase 
affiliation (Lakin & Chartrand, 2003), and lead to more pro-social behavior (van Baaren et al. 
2004) and cooperation (Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009). This is the recipe the military seem to be 
following when they submit recruits to close-order drill in order to promote esprit de corps 
among them. In addition, the two sets of processes appear to be mutually reinforcing and 
could therefore create a snowball effect. The identification with the group that may initially 
motivate agents to engage in a joint action would lead to more co-representation and motor 
synchrony, which would in turn increase affiliation and social bonding, thus making it even 
more likely that agency is experienced as we-agency. If, in contrast, one's initial motivations 
to engage in joint action are of a more selfish nature and the joint action is only seen as an 
efficient mean to promote one's self-interests and if, in addition, the structure of the joint 
action is not such that close motor synchrony or co-representation of one's partners actions are 
essential to its successful performance, than a sense of self-agency is more likely to prevail.  
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6. Conclusion 
This paper on the phenomenology of joint agency proposed a foray into a little explored 
territory at the intersection of two very active domains of research: joint action and sense of 
agency. This exploration of the phenomenology of joint action was guided by the assumption 
that the principle of congruence between predicted and actual outcomes which is central to the 
sense of agency for individual actions is also at work in generating the sense of agency for 
joint actions. However, an investigation of the phenomenology of joint action must take into 
account two sets of complications. 
First, the mechanisms of action specification and control involved in joint action are 
typically more complex than those present in individual actions, since it is crucial for joint 
action that people coordinate their plans and actions. To do so, they must be able to predict 
not just the effects of their own actions, but also the effects of their co-agents actions and the 
way these effects will combine.  I explored the implications that these coordination 
requirements bearing on joint actions might have for the strength of the sense of agency an 
agent may have for a joint outcome. In particular, I argued that the strength of the sense of 
agency one may experience for a joint action is a function of the accuracy not just of self-
predictions but also of other-predictions and joint predictions and that this accuracy may vary 
according to the type of joint action and to the role one plays in a joint action.  
A second set of complications is linked to the possibility that engagement in joint 
action may involve a transformation of agentive identity and a partial or complete shift from a 
sense of self-agency to a sense of we-agency. I suggested that one's agentive identity when 
engaged in a joint action is a function of both predictability and differentiability: the more 
accurate other-predictions are and the less distinguishable self-predictions are from other-
predictions, the greater the shift towards a sense of we-agency.  
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Let me conclude with some general remarks on how this bears on our understanding 
of social reality. Up to now, philosophical debates concerning the ontological commitments of 
theories of joint action have been mostly pitched at the level of intentions, with disputes over 
whether shared intentions can or not be analyzed in terms of individual intentions and over 
whether the subjects of shared intention are interrelated individuals or collective agents. 
Consideration of the phenomenology of joint action and of the processes that underlie it 
suggest a different way of approaching these issues, challenging what Schmid (2005) calls the 
'atomistic conception of the individual'. Engaging in joint action appears to involve a 
transformation of agentive identity, traceable both through the psychological processes that 
support joint action, some of which are neither required nor operating in individual actions, 
and through the impact they have on agentive experience.  Understanding under what 
conditions individuals come to think of themselves, act, and feel qua members of a team may 
be an essential entry point into the nature of social reality.  
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